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NOTE
CARRILLO V. LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE:
AN EXPANSION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS
Deborah J. Livesay
Legislate as we may... the army of the injured will still in-
crease, the price of our manufacturing greatness will still have
to be paid in human blood and tears. To speak of the common-
law personal injury action as a remedy for this problem is to
jest with serious subjects, to give a stone to one who asks for
food.
I. INTRODUCTION
Workers hurt on the job often face mounting medical bills at
a time when injuries impair their ability to work. Knowing they
have the right to pursue the responsible party through protract-
ed, expensive legal battles offers little comfort to those struggling
to pay their bills. Before the advent of workers' compensation
laws, however, injured workers had few other avenues of recov-
ery.
Although most workplaces no longer resemble the sweat
factories of the industrial age, many workers continue to spend
significant portions of their day on the job. Sharing the rigors of
the workplace often leads to a sense of camaraderie and friend-
ship among co-workers. Increasingly, progressive employers no
longer view an employee in terms of production alone; instead,
employers recognize the value of accommodating a worker's hu-
1. Samuel B. Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Com-
pensation, 12 LAW SoC'Y J. 465, 469 n.6 (1947) (quoting Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133
N.W. 209 (Wis. 1911) (upholding the constitutionality of the Wisconsin compensation
act)).
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man side as well. This relatively recent development is illustrat-
ed by the widespread prevalence of recreational activities spon-
sored by or, at least, encouraged by employers.2 Further, most
employers permit an occasional break in production to allow
workers to acknowledge special occasions such as co-worker
birthdays, marriages, or retirements. Employers recognize signif-
icant benefits from periodically supporting recreational or social
breaks because such efforts often lead to enhanced employee
satisfaction, increased productivity, and improved company loyal-
ty.
Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Montana apparently rec-
ognized the reality of the modern workplace and structured its
business operations accordingly.' The company facilitated a
close-knit working relationship among workers by forming "cells"
in which a group of individuals worked together under one su-
pervisor.4 Carol Ann Carrillo, a systems testing specialist for
BCBS, and her co-workers shared a working environment that
was not just productive, but social as well. The employees rou-
tinely honored those leaving the company with going-away gifts
and parties.5 Supervisors usually participated in these celebra-
tions.6 When Carrillo's supervisor decided to leave the company,
Carrillo volunteered to purchase her going-away gift during an
afternoon break.7 Carrillo was struck by a car while walking
toward a gift shop located in another BCBS building near her
office.' Because she believed her injuries occurred while she was
performing a work-related task, Carrillo filed a workers' compen-
sation claim.' BCBS's insurer denied Carrillo workers' compen-
sation benefits claiming that her accident did not arise out of
and in the course of her employment.1"
The Montana Constitution entitles an individual, injured by
someone other than an employer or co-worker, to recover damag-
es from that other person despite the availability of workers'
2. See 2 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION LAW § 22.00, at 5-87 (1997).
3. See Carrillo v. Liberty Northwest Ins., 278 Mont. 1, 3, 922 P.2d 1189, 1191
(1996) (referring generally to BCBS's policy of allowing two fifteen-minute breaks
each day, encouraging healthy lifestyles among employees, and permitting going-away
parties); see also Appellant's Brief at 4-9, Carrillo (No. 95-396).
4. See Appellant's Brief at 4, Carrillo (No. 95-396).
5. See id. at 4.
6. See id. at 6.
7. See id. at 4.
8. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 2, 922 P.2d at 1190.
9. See id.
10. See Respondent's Brief at 2, Carrillo (No. 95-396).
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compensation." The framers of the constitution apparently add-
ed the specific reference to workers' compensation not to limit a
worker's rights, but to clarify the spectrum of recovery options
available to Montanans. 2 This constitutional provision illus-
trates both the state's propensity for affording individuals exten-
sive rights and the framers' desire to clarify that workers should
have broad access to redress when injured on the job. Neverthe-
less, courts recognize that workers' compensation targets work-
related injuries only and cannot cover injuries occurring under
circumstances bearing little, if any, relationship to a worker's
employment. 3 The appropriateness of awarding workers' com-
pensation benefits hinges on whether the injury "arose out of
and in the course of employment." 14 Thus, a court's interpreta-
tion of this language drives the availability of compensation by
defining the scope of activities an employee may be engaged in
when injured.
This Note discusses the Montana Supreme Court's expansion
of workers' compensation coverage in Carrillo v. Liberty North-
west Insurance.5 Part II offers an historical background of
workers' compensation in the United States. Part III presents
the statutory scheme for workers' compensation in Montana and
discusses the court's earlier interpretations of the statutes. Part
IV examines the facts of the Carrillo decision, the lower court's
holding, and the Montana Supreme Court's holding. Part V ana-
lyzes the Montana Supreme Court's reasoning in Carrillo. Part
VI concludes by suggesting that although this decision provides a
useful map for evaluating claims, future inconsistencies may
result because the court did not clearly articulate the reasons
behind its decision to either relax or ignore some past criteria.
11. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16 (1972) (stating that "no person shall be
deprived of this full legal redress for injury incurred in employment for which anoth-
er person may be liable except as to fellow employees and his immediate employer
who hired him if such immediate employer provides coverage under the Workmen's
Compensation Laws of this state").
12. See Montana Constitutional Convention § 16 Comments (1971-72) (clarifying
committee's intent that the Workmen's Compensation Laws will be used to provide
compensation to injured workers rather than to deprive injured workers of redress
against negligent third parties simply because their immediate employer is covered
by Workmen's Compensation).
13. See JEFFREY V. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION 12 (2d ed.
1989).
14. See id.
15. 278 Mont. 1, 922 P.2d 1189 (1996).
147
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Workers' compensation is a fault-free system for compensat-
ing employees injured in an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment." The system benefits both employees
and employers. Injured employees receive benefits, without the
necessity of assigning blame for negligence, in exchange for giv-
ing up their right to sue the employer for damages.17 Similarly,
in exchange for relinquishing their common law defenses, em-
ployers are freed from the cost and uncertainty of personal in-
jury suits. 8 Laws addressing work-related injuries evolved
through three fairly distinct phases including the pre-compensa-
tion period, early employer liability statutes and modern
workers' compensation laws. 9
A Pre-Compensation Period
During the early nineteenth century, a negligence suit re-
mained the sole relief for workers injured on the job." Believing
that the industrialization of America furthered the common good,
courts heavily favored employers in these suits,2' and as such,
injured workers prevailed less than twenty percent of the time
when suing their employers.' In addition to denying standing
to sue to the survivors of a worker who died as a result of a
work-related injury, courts also placed the burden of establishing
the employer's negligence on any employee who received a work-
related injury.' Because the courts were interested primarily in
causation, once the worker met his or her burden, an employer
defeated the claim by showing that its actions did not physically
cause the injuries.' The employer's arsenal of defenses, com-
monly called the "unholy trinity," included the contributory neg-
ligence, fellow-servant, and assumption of risk doctrines.'
16. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 1.10, at 1-1.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See HERMAN MELES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION 17 (1954).
20. See id.
21. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 4.30, at 2-4.
22. See Horovitz, supra note 1, at 467.
23. See SOMERS, supra note 19, at 17-18.
24. See id. at 18.
25. See id.
[Vol. 59
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1. The Contributory Negligence Doctrine
The courts began using the theory of contributory negligence
to relieve employers of liability in 1809.26 Even though liability
was premised on the idea that the party at fault should bear the
cost of occupational injuries, the burden fell on the employee to
establish the employer's negligence.27 The difficulty of this bur-
den protected many employers from liability since co-workers,
often the only witnesses, were reluctant to risk losing their jobs
by testifying.' Injured workers were further disadvantaged be-
cause the employer could rebut by showing that the employee
contributed to the injury.29 Even if the employer's level of re-
sponsibility was much greater than that of the employee, the
negligence claim failed, thereby relieving the employer of all
liability.3' As such, employees rarely prevailed in suits against
their employers.
2. The Fellow-Servant Doctrine
As early as the 1700s, the theory of vicarious liability en-
abled an injured party to recover damages from a master for
injuries caused by that master's servant or employee.3' The
courts effectively abolished this liability in 1837 if the victim also
happened to be a worker injured on the job.32 If some action on
the part of a co-worker or fellow-servant caused the harm, the
employer bore no liability even if the employer created working
conditions that were inherently dangerous.' An English Lord
first articulated the fellow-servant doctrine in 1837 when decid-
ing whether a butcher bore any liability for injuries suffered by
an employee injured after a co-worker overloaded his delivery
26. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 4.30, at 2-5 (stating that contributory negli-
gence was first recognized as a defense against employer liability in Butterfield v.
Forrester, 11 East 60 (1809)).
27. See SOMERS, supra note 19, at 18.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 4.20, at 2-3.
32. See id. § 4.30, at 2-3 (discussing Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030
(1837) (holding that a butcher was not liable for injuries suffered by an employee
van driver even though the injuries were caused when another of the butcher's em-
ployees negligently overloaded the van)).
33. See, e.g., id. § 4.30, at 2-3 to 2-5 (discussing Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng.
Rep. 1030 (1837) and Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49
(1842) (denying compensation to locomotive engineer who lost his hand due to
switchman's carelessness)).
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van.3 4 The court absolved the employer of liability for the
worker's injuries because the injuries followed from the direct
actions of the fellow employee.35
American courts quickly adopted this doctrine.3" A Massa-
chusetts court relieved a railroad of liability to a locomotive
engineer who lost his hand due to the actions of a switchman. 7
The engineer and switchman never worked together and, accord-
ing to one commentator, "the engineer could not have foreseen or
guarded against the switchman's actions."' Ironically, had the
injury occurred to a stranger, a patron of the railroad perhaps,
the railroad's liability would have been unquestioned even
though an employee caused the damage.39 The courts justified
the different outcomes by applying contract theory to injured
employees while applying tort liability to injured strangers.'
This attitude illustrates the climate permeating the courts dur-
ing the mid-nineteenth century; one favoring industrial develop-
ment at the expense of injured employees.41
3. The Assumption of Risk Doctrine
Attempting to enlarge their protective net around industrial
employers, courts also allowed an assumption of risk defense
against claims by injured workers.42 The defense was first artic-
ulated in Priestly v. Fowler, an English case decided in the early
nineteenth century.43 The court's reasoning suggested that a
freedom of contract theory governed the relationship between
employees and their masters. Courts adopting this theory as-
sumed that individual workers possessed as much knowledge as
the employer about potential dangers in the workplace." Pre-
suming that workers enjoyed the freedom to refuse to perform
34. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 4.30, at 2-3 (discussing the facts of Priestly
v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837)).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See SOMERS, supra note 19, at 20 (discussing Farwell v. Boston & Worcester
R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842)).
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 4.30, at 2-4 (implying that all aspects of the
employee's relationship with the employer was governed by the employment contract).
41. See id.
42. See id. § 4.30, at 2-4.
43. See id. § 4.30, at 2-3 to 2-4 (discussing Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep.
1030 (1837)).
44. See id. § 4.30, at 2-4 to 2-5 (discussing Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep.
1030 (1837) and Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met) 49 (1842)).
[Vol. 59
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potentially dangerous tasks, the courts held that individuals who
chose to perform those tasks also chose to personally assume the
risk.45 The courts refused to charge an employer with negli-
gence if they found the worker had assumed the risk of perform-
ing the task giving rise to the injury." Specifically, the Priestly
Court denied an injured delivery employee recovery on the as-
sumption that he lacked standing to sue because he knew the
dangerous conditions involved in the job when he undertook its
performance.47
The assumption of risk doctrine, along with the contributory
negligence and fellow-servant doctrines, formed the "unholy
trinity" of defenses. These defenses allowed employers to conduct
business without regard for employee safety, while leaving work-
ers with little or no recourse when injured on the job. This at-
titude prevailed until the late nineteenth century when
America's workforce looked to its legislatures for relief from the
courts' pro-employer decisions.
B. Early Employer Liability Statutes
High rates of industrial injuries and deaths marked the late
nineteenth century." While workers continued to bring suits,
meager recoveries financially drained communities forced to
support the mounting number of injured employees.4 Legisla-
tures responded to increasing community outcry by passing
employers' liability laws designed to level the legal playing field
by reducing the employers' common law defenses.' Legislatures
specifically targeted the fellow-servant doctrine by directing
statutes toward ultrahazardous occupations such as railroads
and mining operations.5
Two common law notions formed the foundation of these
statutes. An employer's liability was either limited to the dam-
age resulting from its own negligence, or limited to individuals
for whom the respondeat superior doctrine made the employer
45. See id.
46. See Wager v. White Star Candy Co., 217 N.Y.S., 173, 175 (1924) (denying
compensation for tuberculosis contracted due to damp, unsanitary workplace because
girl was "fully aware of the conditions under which she worked") (cited in SOMERS,
supra note 19, at 19).
47. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 4.30, at 2-4.
48. See id. § 5.20, at 2-15.
49. See SOMERS, supra note 19, at 21.
50. See id.
51. See id.
151
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generally responsible.52 None of the existing legislation offered
relief for either the forty-two percent of employees injured in no-
fault accidents or the twenty-nine percent who negligently
caused their own injuries." Even those recovering under the
evolving laws were often left destitute after deducting funeral,
medical and legal expenses from their awards.'M
C. Modern Workers' Compensation Laws
Following the lead of both Germany and England, the Unit-
ed States first began experimenting with workers' compensation
around the turn of the twentieth century.55 Increases in indus-
trial accidents, combined with a lack of remedies available to in-
jured employees, spurred states to create commissions responsi-
ble for investigating solutions to this problem.56
During a 1910 conference in Chicago, representatives of
these commissions drafted a Uniform Workmen's Compensation
Law which "set the fundamental pattern of legislation."57 By
1920, all but eight states had adopted compensation acts and, by
1963, every state had enacted a regulatory scheme for workers'
compensation." Employers saved the cost of defending tort lia-
bility suits by giving up the "unholy trinity" of defenses while
employees' increased their chance of receiving some compensa-
tion by forfeiting their ability to sue for tort damages.59 Essen-
tially, workers' compensation laws began to treat the cost of
work-related, personal injuries as an expense of doing business
which was passed on to the consumers.'
52. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 4.50, at 2-8 (discussing the Georgia Act of
1855 (abrogating the fellow-servant defense for railway companies) and the Federal
Employers' Liability Act of 1908 (stating that contributory negligence should only
mitigate damages and that traditional common law defenses were inapplicable in
cases of safety-statute violations)).
53. See id. § 4.50, at 2-9 to 2-10 (citing German statistics indicative of Ameri-
can problem and confirmed, in part, by the Minnesota and Wisconsin Labor Depart-
ments).
54. See id. § 4.50, at 2-10.
55. See id. § 5.20, at 2-15.
56. See id. "[AIll legislation prior to the workers' compensation acts . . . [was
based on the premise] that the employer was liable to the employee only for the
negligence or fault of the employer or, at most, of someone whom the employer was
generally responsible for under the respondeat superior doctrine." See id. § 4.30, at
2-8.
57. Id. § 5.20, at 2-15.
58. See id. § 5.30, at 2-25.
59. See id. § 1.10, at 1-1.
60. See 1 WILLIAM R. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §1,
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Eventually every state's compensation act incorporated the
"arising out of and in the course of employment" standard for
determining if an injury was compensable. 1 Unfortunately, this
standard created more litigation than any other in the compen-
sation field.62 For ease of construction, courts traditionally in-
terpreted the two parts of the phrase separately.' "Arising out
of... employment" referred to the causal connection between
the injury and the employment, whereas "in the course of em-
ployment" referred to the time, place, and circumstances of the
accident in relation to the employment.6' Although some courts
insisted that the two requirements be met independently, this
practice sometimes excluded injuries that were truly work-relat-
ed.' For instance, cases involving striking workers attacking
non-striking employees attempting to get to work exemplify
instances in which individuals were denied coverage because
they failed the "in the course of employment" portion of the
test." The failure occurred because the employees were not
injured while working, but while going to work."7 Although em-
ployees are generally not in the course of employment at such
times, these workers suffered injuries as a result of their employ-
ment." To remedy this flaw in the system, commentators sug-
gest balancing the two parts of the requirement by allowing the
strength of one portion to compensate for the deficiency of the
other.69 Consequently, fair application of the rule that an injury
arise out of and in the course of employment requires the evalua-
tion of its two portions together instead of deciding either in a
vacuum.
at 3 (2d ed. 1932).
61. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, at 3-1.
62. See id.
63. See id. § 6.10, at 3-3.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See 2 LARSON, supra note 2, § 29.21(b), at 5-511 to 5-512 (citing Enterprise
Foundry Co. v. Industrial Accident Comrn'n, 275 P. 432 (Cal. 1929) (denying recovery
to survivors of non-striking employee fatally shot by strikers on his way to work)
and Walsh v. Russeks Fifth Ave., 41 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1943) (denying compensation to
survivors of employee fatally assaulted by striking workers while going home from
work)).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id § 29.00, at 5-501; see also NACKLEY, supra note 13, at 13.
153
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III. WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN MONTANA
A. Montana's Workers' Compensation Statute
Modeled after the British Compensation Act formula,0
Montana's workers' compensation statute requires an employer's
insurance company to compensate an employee who suffers an
injury arising out of and in the course of employment. 1 Because
no exact formula exists for determining whether an accident
arises out of and in the course of employment, the facts and
circumstances of each case are determinative. 2 For example, a
Glacier National Park hotel manager suffered injuries during a
car accident while he was returning from a nearby lodge where
he had replaced borrowed food, obtained money to stock the cash
register, and discussed food transfers.73 Despite the manager
consuming alcohol while at the neighboring lodge,74 the court
decided the accident arose in the course of employment because
the tasks performed just prior to injury were within his manage-
rial discretion, and thus, reasonably connected to his employ-
ment.75 Conversely, the court denied coverage to an employee,
injured while fighting with a co-worker, on the grounds that no
reasonable connection existed between the cause of the injury
and the employment.76
Even though decisions are fact-specific, the pattern illustrat-
ed by these examples suggests that the "arising out of and in the
course of employment" requirement contemplates that an em-
ployee be engaged in an action at least remotely connected to the
employer's business.77 Montana's legislature and courts followed
70. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 6.10, at 3-1 (the British Compensation Act
uses the "injury arising out of and in the course of employment" formula to deter-
mine compensation).
71. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-407(1) (1997).
72. See Partoll v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 122 Mont. 305, 310-11, 203
P.2d 974, 977 (1949) (denying compensation to claimant for injuries sustained in
automobile accident occurring after his shift because evidence was insufficient to
show that employer gave claimant a letter to be mailed by claimant in another city).
73. See Parker v. Glacier Park, Inc., 249 Mont. 225, 227, 815 P.2d. 583, 585
(1991).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 229, 815 P.2d at 586.
76. See Penny v. Anaconda Co., 194 Mont. 409, 413-14, 632 P.2d 1114, 1117
(1981).
77. See also Pinyerd v. State Comp. Ins. Fund., 271 Mont. 115, 894 P.2d 932
(1995) (finding reasonable connection between employment and injury suffered during
an assault by co-worker because company fostered intensely competitive atmosphere
by pitting employees against each other for sales quotas and commissions without
establishing any framework within which to compete).
10
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this principle when considering workers' compensation law.
1. The "Going to and from Work" Limitation
Despite the fact-specific nature of the decisions, Montana
courts generally found that actions occurring as employees go to
and from work fell outside the course and scope of employ-
ment.78 For instance, the court denied coverage to a claimant
for an injury sustained while commuting to work. 9 According to
the Montana Supreme Court, only if transportation allowances
are part of the employment contract, or recognized by legislative
enactment, will injuries sustained while traveling to or from
work be in the course of employment."
The Montana Legislature codified this "going to and from
work" rule to exclude unpaid lunch breaks and the period before
and after an employee's shift from the definition of course of
employment. 1 A 1987 legislative amendment provided excep-
tions to this general rule for individuals whose travel relates to
their employment.82 The exceptions include instances where (1)
travel expenses are reimbursed as part of the employee's benefits
and the travel is necessitated by and on behalf of the employer
as an integral condition of employment; or (2) travel is required
by the employer as part of an employee's duties." For example,
if a payment for transportation is specifically provided for in an
employment contract, then any injuries sustained en route are
compensable because they fall within one of the delineated ex-
ceptions."
78. See Dale v. Trade St., Inc., 258 Mont. 349, 352, 854 P.2d 828, 829 (1993)
(citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-407 (1987)).
79. See Buhl v. Warm Springs State Hosp., 236 Mont. 363, 769 P.2d 1258
(1989) (citing Hagerman v. Galen State Hosp., 174 Mont. 249, 250, 570 P.2d. 893,
894 (1977) (denying compensation to nurse for injuries from automobile accident
while commuting because claimant's employment contract did not provide for travel
pay)).
80. See id. at 365, 769 P.2d at 1259 (1989).
81. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-407(3) (1997) (stating that an employee who
suffers an injury while traveling is not covered unless the employer furnishes the
transportation or the employee receives reimbursement from the employer for costs of
travel, gas, oil, or lodging as a part of the employee's benefits or employment agree-
ment; and the travel is necessitated by and on behalf of the employer as an integral
part or condition of the employment; or the travel is required by the employer as
part of the employee's job duties).
82. See Carrillo v. Liberty Northwest Ins., 278 Mont. 1, 8, 922 P.2d 1189, 1194
(1996).
83. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-407(3) (1997).
84. See Gordon v. H. C. Smith Constr. Co., 188 Mont. 166, 612 P.2d. 668 (1980)
(finding death of employee killed while traveling en route to or from work fell within
155
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Focusing on the level of control retained by the employer,
courts draw a distinction between unpaid lunch breaks and short
paid breaks. 5 Lunch breaks, as well as travel at the beginning
or end of a workday, are usually subject to the "going to and
from work" rule because the employer relinquishes its authority
over the employee.' Injuries occurring during short paid
breaks, on the other hand, fall within the purview of workers'
compensation if the employer retains some authority over the
employee.87
2. The Montana Supreme Court's Analysis of Statutory Elements
Even if the injured employee's actions fall outside the "going
to and from work" rule, the accident must still arise out of and
in the course of employment if he is to recover under Montana's
workers' compensation laws. Historically, Montana interpreted
the terms of this requirement in the conjunctive. Accordingly,
the claimant had to prove not only that the nature of the injury
was work-related, but also that the injury occurred during a time
and at a place associated with the employment."
The modem interpretation examines whether a reasonable
connection exists between the injury and the employment.89
Frequently, this depends on the amount of authority exerted by
the employer at the time of the injury. An injury may be com-
pensable if (1) the activity was undertaken at the employer's
request; (2) the employer, either directly or indirectly, compelled
the employee's attendance at the activity; (3) the employer con-
trolled or participated in the activity; and (4) both the employer
and employee mutually benefitted from the activity." Instead of
considering any one factor dispositive, courts following the mod-
exception to "going to and from work" rule because union contract required payment
of travel allowance).
85. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.54, at 4-181 to 4-182 (citing In re Helen
F. Gunderson, No. 54-36 (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Empl. Comp. App. Bd., April 13, 1955)
(stating that "drinking coffee . . . during recognized breaks in daily work hours is
now so generally accepted in industrial life of our Nation as to constitute a work-
related activity . . . so that engaging in such activity does not take an employee out
of the course of his employment")).
86. See id. § 15.54, at 4-181.
87. See id. § 15.54, at 4-181 to 4-184.
88. See Wiggins v. Industrial Accident Bd., 54 Mont. 335, 343, 170 P. 9, 9-10
(1918).
89. See Pinyerd v. State Comp. Ins. Fund., 271 Mont. 115, 121, 894 P.2d 932,
935 (1995).
90. See Barthule v. Karman, 268 Mont. 477, 485, 886 P.2d 971, 976 (1994).
[Vol. 59
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ern interpretation apply a totality of circumstances test when
evaluating these factors.91 Because the extent of employer au-
thority is not necessarily clear, particularly with off-premises
injuries, many disputed claims center around this question.92
B. Montana's Common Law
Prior to 1996, the Montana Supreme Court had yet to decide
whether injuries occurring during a short break arose out of and
in the course of employment.93 The court shed light on this is-
sue, however, when interpreting the relationship between the
workers' compensation statute and injuries sustained by employ-
ees during lunch breaks9 and while traveling.95
In 1947, the court held that an activity "sufficiently inciden-
tal" to employment arises out of and in the course of employment
and awarded compensation to an employee injured while playing
handball on his employer's premises during his lunch break."
Not only did the employer insist that the employees remain on
the premises and on-call during their lunch breaks, but the su-
pervisor generally allowed the employees to play handball during
their lunch breaks.97 The court found the injury incidental to
employment because these factors created a sufficient causal
connection between the handball game and the employment.98
Thus, a compensable injury need not arise while an employee is
performing a task directly related to employment, so long as it
arises from an activity incidental to employment.
As previously mentioned, the Montana Supreme Court ap-
plied a four-part test to determine when an injury is work-relat-
ed.9 Montana first adopted this test in 1984 for a case involv-
91. See id.
92. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.54, at 4-183 to 4-192.
93. See Carrillo v. Liberty Northwest Ins., 278 Mont. 1, 9, 922 P.2d 1189, 1194
(1996).
94. See Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. 120 Mont. 485, 188 P.2d 185,
(1947).
95. See Courser v. Darby Sch. Dist., 214 Mont. 13, 692 P.2d 417 (1984); see
also Strickland v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund, 273 Mont. 254, 259, 901 P.2d 1391,
1394 (1995).
96. Geary, 120 Mont. at 490, 188 P.2d at 187.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91. See also Courser, 214 Mont. at
16-17, 692 P.2d at 419 (1984); Barthule v. Karman, 268 Mont. 477, 485, 886 P.2d
971, 976 (1994) (weighing factors and applying totality of circumstances test to decide
substantial evidence existed to submit to the jury the question of whether Barthule
was an employee of Karman).
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ing the "going to and from work" rule, Courser v. Darby School
District,1" noting that it is commonly applied in other jurisdic-
tions. l1 The factors of the Courser test include the following:
"(1) whether the activity was undertaken at the employer's re-
quest; (2) whether the employer, either directly or indirectly,
compelled [the] employee's attendance at the activity; (3) wheth-
er the employer controlled or participated in the activity; and (4)
whether both [the] employer and [the] employee mutually bene-
fited from the activity.""°2 The court said the "presence or ab-
sence of each factor may, or may not, be determinative and the
significance of each factor must be considered in the totality of
all attendant circumstances. " 1"3
Applying these factors, the Courser court held that injuries
suffered by a school teacher during a motorcycle accident were
work-related because the accident occurred while he was return-
ing to college for summer graduate classes. 1' The court found
the school district employer exerted control over the teacher by
requiring that he earn a master's degree before being promot-
ed.1" Moreover, the court found the mutual benefit element
sufficiently satisfied because the claimant received a salary in-
crease for completing the summer courses while the school dis-
trict "received the benefit of maintaining a highly-qualified
teaching faculty.""° By methodically comparing the facts of the
case to the exceptions of the "going to and from work" rule, the
court demonstrated its firm adherence to this rule for cases in-
volving an employee injured while traveling.1 7 Unfortunately,
the court's reasoning provided little guidance to lower courts
facing decisions about the appropriateness of awarding compen-
sation to non-traveling employees injured while off their work
premises.
The court applied the Courser test nine years later when a
trucker was injured in an accident after he resumed his delivery
schedule following a six-hour visit with his brother." s Finding
100. 214 Mont. 13, 692 P.2d 417 (1984).
101. See Courser, 214 Mont. at 16-17, 692 P.2d at 419.
102. Id. (citing Shannon v. St. Louis Bd. of Educ., 577 S.W.2d 949, 951-2 (Mo.
1979)).
103. Id. at 17, 692 P.2d at 419.
104. See id. at 15, 19, 692 P.2d at 418, 420.
105. See id. at 18-19, 692 P.2d at 420.
106. Id. at 17, 692 P.2d at 419.
107. See id. at 16-19, 692 P.2d at 418-20.
108. See Dale v. Trade St., Inc., 258 Mont. 349, 351, 355, 854 P.2d 828, 829,
831-32 (1993).
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that his injury did not arise out of and in the course of employ-
ment, the court said he had temporarily abandoned his employ-
ment and his activities during the deviation provided no benefit
to his employer."1° The court said that compensation for an
injury incurred while traveling was only appropriate if the em-
ployer received some identifiable benefit.1 '
The Montana Supreme Court expanded the applicability of
the Courser test in 1994 by applying its factors to an injury that
did not involve the "going to and from work" rule."' The court
upheld an award of compensation to a ranch hand injured while
assisting a neighboring rancher.1 2 The court considered evi-
dence indicating that the common practice among neighboring
ranches was to allow ranch hands to help with various tasks at
other ranches.' A ranch hand was still considered an employ-
ee of, and was paid by, his original employer while helping the
neighboring rancher.14 Testimony also suggested that the
ranchers benefitted from helping each other.' The court found
that this evidence sufficiently satisfied the totality of circum-
stances requirement set forth in Courser."6
Finally, in 1995, the court had an opportunity to decide
whether an injury sustained by an employee while on break
arose out of and in the course of employment."7 Instead of ad-
dressing the issue of whether or not the employee was on break
when injured, the court applied the "going to and from work"
rule. ' The employee was injured in a car accident after leav-
ing work for a short time to purchase a newspaper and some
pain medication.1 Finding that her injury occurred while on a
personal errand, the court decided she was not acting in the
course and scope of her employment because none of the statuto-
109. See id. at 355-57, 854 P.2d at 832; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 228 (1958) (limiting employer liability when an employee deviates from the
course of his employment parallels principles of agency law which limit the master's
liability for acts of a servant who has exceeded the scope of his employment).
110. See Dale, 258 Mont. at 355, 854 P.2d at 832.
111. See Barthule v. Karman, 268 Mont. 477, 886 P.2d 971 (1994).
112. See id. at 486-87, 886 P.2d at 977.
113. See id. at 486, 886 P.2d at 977.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Strickland v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund, 273 Mont. 254, 901 P.2d
1391 (1995).
118. See id. at 259, 901 P.2d at 1394.
119. See id. at 255-56, 901 P.2d at 1392.
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ry exceptions to the "going to and from work" rule applied.1"
As the decisions discussed above suggest, the Montana Su-
preme Court typically evaluated the circumstances in which an
employee was injured to determine if they were reasonably con-
nected to the employment.121 In making this determination, the
court looked at whether the injuries occurred while the employee
performed tasks incidental to employment,2 ' while the employ-
er exercised authority over the employee," = or while the em-
ployee performed a task of some identifiable benefit to the em-
ployer."u If the accident did not occur at the workplace, the
court usually analyzed the facts under the "going to and from
work" rule and denied coverage unless a designated exception
applied." Prior to the Carrillo decision, the court never direct-
ly addressed the issue of whether injuries suffered by an em-
ployee while on an authorized break arose out of and in the
course of employment.
IV. THE CARRILLO DECISION
A- The Facts
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Montana employed Carol Ann
Carrillo as a systems testing specialist in Helena.1" To effi-
ciently meet its business demands, BCBS organized its workforce
into "cells" composed of a small group of workers and one super-
visor."2  Beth Lamping supervised Carrillo's cell."2  Carrillo
often sacrificed personal time, including time with her family, to
meet the stringent demands of her job."2 Even when working
up to seventy-two hours a week, she often remained on call while
120. See id. at 259, 901 P.2d at 1394.
121. See Pinyerd v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 271 Mont. 115, 121, 894 P.2d 932,
935 (1995).
122. See Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. 120 Mont. 485, 490, 188 P.2d
185, 187 (1947).
123. See Courser v. Darby Sch. Dist., 214 Mont. 13, 17-18, 692 P.2d 417, 419-20
(1984).
124. See Dale v. Trade St. Inc., 258 Mont. 349, 355-56, 854 P.2d 828, 832 (1993).
125. See Strickland, 273 Mont. at 259, 901 P.2d at 1394.
126. See Appellant's Brief at 1, Carrillo (No. 95-396); see also Respondent's Brief
at 2, Carrillo (No. 95-396) (stating that because respondent, Liberty, agreed with the
Workers' Compensation Court's fourteen findings of fact, respondent stipulated to the
truth of those facts).
127. See Appellant's Brief at 4, Carrillo (No. 95-396).
128. See id.
129. See id. at 8.
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at home and cut her breaks short when needed.13° In fact,
Carrillo's supervisor was the only person in her cell devoting
more time to the job than Carrillo.'
BCBS realized the work environment was stressful and
encouraged workers to maintain a healthy lifestyle. 32 Carrillo
took advantage of this policy by walking during ninety percent of
her breaks."3 Apparently recognizing the close-knit working
environment the cell structure facilitated, BCBS also allowed its
employees, both supervisors and workers, to spend company time
planning and throwing going-away parties for those employees
either being promoted or leaving the company. 3 Several em-
ployees, including Carrillo's supervisor, commented that events
such as going-away parties benefited BCBS by "increas[ing] em-
ployee morale and work production.""
After Beth Lamping, Carrillo's supervisor, decided to leave
the company in 1993, her cell planned to give her a surprise
party and a going-away gift."3 Although the cell saw the party
and gift as a means of expressing their care and respect, they
also felt such events were expected and customary.'37 Carrillo
and her co-workers decided to purchase a coffee mug for
Lamping from a gift shop located a few blocks from BCBS's of-
fice."3 Carrillo agreed to pick up the mug. 39 Carrillo never
bought the mug nor did she return to work that day; a car struck
her as she crossed an intersection near the gift shop."4
B. Lower Court Rulings
Carrillo filed a timely claim with BCBS's workers' compensa-
tion insurer, Liberty Northwest Insurance (Liberty), seeking
compensation for the injuries she sustained when the car struck
her.'" Liberty denied her claim on the ground that the accident
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 3; see also Carrillo v. Liberty Northwest Ins., 278 Mont. 1, 3, 922
P.2d 1189, 1191 (1996) (stating that although BCBS encouraged a healthy lifestyle
among its employees, it did not require them to walk during breaks).
133. See Appellant's Brief at 8, Carrillo (No. 95-396).
134. See id. at 3, 6.
135. Id. at 6.
136. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 3, 922 P.2d at 1191.
137. See Appellant's Brief at 9, Carrillo (No. 95-396).
138. See id. at 5.
139. See id. at 4.
140. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 2, 922 P.2d at 1190.
141. See id.
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did not arise out of and in the course of employment because she
had abandoned her employment.142 Carrillo then filed a Peti-
tion for Hearing with the Workers' Compensation Court claiming
that the accident occurred while she was on a paid break."
Carrillo further contended that she had not abandoned her em-
ployment because purchasing gifts and giving going-away parties
during employee breaks were customary and expected activities
at BCBS.'4
The Workers' Compensation Court based its decision solely
on whether Carrillo met the requirements of section 39-71-
407(3)141 of the Montana Code Annotated, and did not specifi-
cally find whether or not Carrillo was on break when in-
jured."0 As noted, this section states the general rule that em-
ployees injured while traveling to and from work are not covered
by the Workers' Compensation Act unless their actions fall with-
in one of the delineated exceptions. 47 The exceptions include
injuries sustained either during travel in which an employer
provides transportation or reimburses an employee's travel costs,
or during travel "required by the employer as part of the
employee's job duties."" The Workers' Compensation Court
concluded that Carrillo was traveling when the accident oc-
curred, but that none of the exceptions applied.149 Accordingly,
the court ruled that her injury did not arise out of and in the
course of her employment and denied her workers' compensation
benefits.' Carrillo appealed the Workers' Compensation
Court's decision.' 5'
142. See id. at 2-3.
143. See id. at 2.
144. See Appellant's Brief at 9, Carrillo (No. 95-396).
145. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-407(3) (1997) (providing that an employee
who suffers an injury or dies while traveling is not covered by this chapter unless
the employer furnishes the transportation or the employee receives reimbursement
from the employer for costs of travel, gas, oil, or lodging as a part of the employee's
benefits or employment agreement; and the travel is necessitated by and on behalf of
the employer as an integral part or condition of the employment or the travel is
required by the employer as part of the employee's job duties).
146. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 5, 922 P.2d at 1192.
147. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-407(3) (1997); see also Dale v. Trade St., Inc.
258 Mont. 349, 352, 854 P.2d 828, 829-30 (1993) (stating that the legislature amend-
ed section 39-71-407 of the Montana Code Annotated to codify exceptions to general
workers' compensation rule that actions occurring when employees are going to and
from work are not within the course and scope of their employment).
148. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-407(3) (1997).
149. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 5, 922 P.2d at 1192.
150. See id. at 4, 922 P.2d at 1191.
151. See id. at 2, 922 P.2d at 1190.
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C. Montana Supreme Court's Holding
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the Workers' Com-
pensation Court by a narrow margin.152 Writing for the majori-
ty, Justice Trieweiler found the lower court erred by basing its
decision solely on Carrillo's failure to meet the requirements of
the "going to and from work" rule.' Pointing to undisputed
evidence, the court concluded that the "going to and from work"
rule did not apply because Carrillo was on a fifteen-minute coffee
break when her accident occurred."M Accordingly, the Montana
Supreme Court analyzed Carrillo on the basis of whether an
employee injured during an authorized break is within the
course and scope of employment. 5 Although two other Mon-
tana cases addressed similar issues,15 the court considered
Carrillo a case of first impression because no previous case in-
volved an employee injured while on an authorized break.157 As
such, the court not only looked to other jurisdictions for guid-
ance, but relied on a respected treatise, Larson's Workers' Com-
pensation Law, which states that short paid breaks are not typi-
cally subject to this rule or its exceptions so long as the employer
retains some authority over the employee." Ultimately, the
court ruled that Carrillo was entitled to workers' compensation
benefits because her injury occurred while she was acting within
the course and scope of her employment.5 9
Justice Erdmann dissented."e Although he agreed that sec-
tion 39-71-407(3) of the Montana Code Annotated was not appli-
cable, ' he believed that "the trip to obtain the [going-away
gift] constituted a substantial personal deviation from employ-
ment." 2 Thus, Justice Erdmann believed that workers' com-
pensation should not cover Carrillo's injury because running a
152. See id.
153. See id. at 8, 922 P.2d at 1194.
154. See id. at 5-6, 922 P.2d at 1192-93 (apparently considering it significant
that the Workers' Compensation Court made no specific finding that Carrillo was not
on break at the time of her injury).
155. See id. at 7, 922 P.2d at 1193.
156. See Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 120 Mont. 485, 188 P.2d 185
(1947); see also Strickland v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund, 273 Mont. 254, 901 P.2d
1391 (1995).
157. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 9, 922 P.2d at 1194.
158. See id. at 9, 922 P.2d at 1194-95. See also infra notes 183, 199-203 and
accompanying text.
159. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 12, 922 P.2d at 1196.
160. See id. at 12, 922 P.2d at 1197 (Erdmann, J. dissenting).
161. See id. at 14, 922 P.2d at 1198 (Erdmann, J. dissenting).
162. Id. at 16, 922 P.2d at 1199 (Erdmann, J. dissenting).
163
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personal errand during break put her outside the scope of em-
ployment.1"
V. ANALYSIS
The Carrillo decision will undoubtedly have a significant
pro-employee impact on future workers' compensation rulings.
Previous holdings exposed the court's discomfort with awarding
an injured employee benefits without a showing that the injury
was reasonably connected to the employment." As noted, past
decisions hinged on whether the injury was incidental to employ-
ment either because the employer directly influenced the
employee's actions at the time of the injury or because the em-
ployer derived some benefit from those actions." By compari-
son, the Carrillo decision will make qualifying for workers' com-
pensation coverage easier in three ways. First, the court estab-
lished a means for determining when an employee, injured off-
premises, is on break, and therefore exempt from the "going to
and from work" rule. Next, the court redefined the level of em-
ployer control necessary to constitute adequate employee influ-
ence. Finally, the court opted to virtually ignore the issue of
whether the employer benefitted from the employee's actions."M
To decide whether an injury is reasonably connected to em-
ployment, the court adopted a test promulgated by Larson's
treatise on workers' compensation law and frequently applied by
other jurisdictions."' Fortunately, by applying the test, the
court charted a course for Montana's trial courts by articulating
the variables necessary for determining when an injury, sus-
tained by an employee during an authorized break, arises out of
and in the course of employment." For example, the portion
focusing on employer control allows courts more latitude than
that previously taken by the Montana Supreme Court when
deciding related issues. The court's failure to explain why it
163. See id. at 17, 922 P.2d at 1199 (Erdmann, J. dissenting).
164. See Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 120 Mont. 485, 490, 188 P.2d
185, 187 (1947); see also Courser v. Darby Sch. Dist., 214 Mont. 13, 17-19, 692 P.2d
417, 419-20 (1984).
165. See Geary, 120 Mont. at 490, 188 P.2d at 187; see also Courser, 214 Mont.
at 17-19, 692 P.2d at 419-20.
166. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 11-12, 922 P.2d at 1196 (referencing employer
benefit merely by stating that Department of Labor acknowledges that breaks serve
the employer's interests).
167. See id. at 9, 922 P.2d at 1194-95. Variables of the test are presented infra
in text accompanying note 183.
168. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 11-12, 922 P.2d at 1195-96.
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ignored the requirement that the employer derive some benefit
from the employee's activities-a requirement mandated in pre-
vious workers' compensation decisions-may create confusion for
lower courts in the future. Preferably, this relaxed standard
indicates the court's conscious choice to make workers' compen-
sation more readily available instead of a means for arriving at
the particular result desired in this case.
A Rationale for Determining if an Employee Is on an
Authorized Break
The majority's entire decision rested on its determination
that Carrillo's injuries arose out of and in the course of employ-
ment while on an authorized break, as opposed to occurring
while she made a personal deviation from work." To begin
this analysis the court needed to establish that Carrillo was
indeed on break. Because the lower court made no specific find-
ing as to whether Carrillo was on break, the majority made that
determination itself.7' The court arrived at its finding by com-
paring the circumstances surrounding Carrillo's accident to
BCBS's break policy and by accepting Carrillo's affirmative an-
swer at trial when asked if she was on break when injured.17 1
Although BCBS did not require employees to take breaks, it
allowed them to take two fifteen- to twenty-minute breaks each
day.7 7 Employees were free to break in the afternoon any time
between about two o'clock and three-thirty. 73 Carrillo testified
that after leaving her office building at two-fifteen, she had
enough time to purchase the going-away gift, pick up a co-worker
at BCBS, grab refreshments, and still make it back to work
within twenty minutes. 74 This testimony, combined with
Carrillo's direct assertion that she was on break and the fact
that the injury occurred during the time allotted for afternoon
breaks, convinced the court that Carrillo was on break when in-
jured. 175
Once the court found that Carrillo's injuries happened while
she was on break, it explained how the lower court's reliance on
169. See id. at 16, 922 P.2d at 1198 (Erdmann, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 6, 922 P.2d at 1193.
171. See id. at 5-6, 922 P.2d at 1192.
172. See id. at 6, 922 P.2d at 1192.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 6, 922 P.2d at 1193.
175. See id. at 8, 922 P.2d at 1194.
165
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the "going to and from work" rule was erroneous.176 According
to Larson's treatise on workers' compensation, unpaid lunch
breaks, like trips at the beginning or end of a workday, are sub-
ject to the "going to and from work" rule, but shorter paid breaks
are not.177 The distinguishing characteristics are the level of
control exercised by the employer and whether the time is
paid.17 Individuals taking unpaid lunch breaks, off-premises,
typically enjoy more freedom because the employer's control is
suspended.'79 Conversely, those taking short paid breaks--even
off-premises--are subject to substantial control by the employer if
the employer limits the duration, distance from the business,
and activities permitted during the break."s The court's analy-
sis clearly distinguished between off-premise movements during
a paid break and unpaid travel subject to the "going to and from
work" rule.
B. Employer's Control Over Employee's Actions
The Montana Supreme Court focused on whether an employ-
ee, injured while on break, was acting within the course of em-
ployment or was deviating from employment. In examining this
question, the court concentrated on the amount of authority
BCBS exercised over Carrillo's activities during the time she was
injured.'' Relying on a list of factors discussed in Larson's
treatise on workers' compensation, the court methodically ap-
plied each of the following variables to the facts of the Carrillo
case.18
2
If the employer, in all circumstances, including duration, short-
ness of the off-premises distance, and limitations on off-premis-
es activity during the interval can be deemed to have retained
authority over the employee, the off-premises injury may be
found to be within the course of employment .... [Relevant
variables include] ... whether the interval is a right fixed by
the employment contract, whether it is a paid interval, whether
there are restrictions on where the employee can go during the
break, and whether the employee's activity during the period
176. See id.
177. See id. at 7, 922 P.2d at 1193 (citing 1 LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 15.51,
15.54).
178. See id. at 8, 922 P.2d at 1194 (citing 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.54).
179. See id.
180. See id. at 7-8, 922 P.2d at 1193-94 (citing 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.54).
181. See id. at 11-12, 922 P.2d at 1195-96.
182. See id.
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constituted a substantial personal deviation."8'
The court concluded that Carrillo satisfied each of the rele-
vant variables.' The court found Carrillo's testimony, along
with the lower court's finding that employees were entitled to a
fifteen-minute break in both the morning and the afternoon,
satisfied the first variable requiring the right be fixed by con-
tract.' Next, the court satisfied the paid interval variable by
accepting Carrillo's testimony that breaks were paid time.1"
The court's analysis of the third variable, whether the em-
ployer restricted the employee's freedom during breaks, illus-
trates its comfort with applying a less stringent standard. First,
the court disposed of this variable by pointing to Carrillo's testi-
mony that her supervisor sometimes asked her to postpone her
break and occasionally called her back early."8 7 Allowing such
occasional acts by a supervisor to satisfy this requirement is
more relaxed than the threshold imposed by the court in previ-
ous decisions. For instance, in Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co.,"' the employer's insistence that garage employees always
remain on the premises and on-call during lunch satisfied this
requirement. 9  Similarly, the court decided the employer
school district in Courser v. Darby School District1"' surpassed
the threshold by mandating that all teachers earn master's de-
grees before receiving promotions and salary increases. 9' Un-
like these earlier decisions, the Carrillo court seemed satisfied
with occasional requests of a particular employee as opposed to
consistent rules applied to all employees. This factor is signifi-
cant, even though the earlier cases did not involve injuries occur-
ring while an employee was on break, because requiring consis-
tent rules might reasonably apply to a variety of employment-re-
lated injuries. The lack of such a requirement implies that a
lower threshold is acceptable when an employee is injured while
on break.
Finally, the court disposed of the fourth requirement-that
the activity not constitute a substantial personal deviation-by
183. 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.54, at 4-183 to 4-184.
184. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 11-12, 922 P.2d at 1195-96.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 11, 922 P.2d at 1196.
187. See id. at 11-12, 922 P.2d at 1196.
188. 120 Mont. 485, 188 P.2d 185 (1947).
189. See Geary, 120 Mont. at 490, 188 P.2d at 187.
190. 214 Mont. 13, 692 P.2d 417 (1984).
191. See Courser, 214 Mont. at 18-19, 692 P.2d at 420.
167
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noting that BCBS, "not only acquiesced in the employees leaving
the building during break, but gave them little choice because of
the inadequate break facilities [provided in the building].""9
The employer's acquiescence in the employees planning and
staging going-away parties, along with the supervisor's routine
participation in the parties, proved persuasive as well.193 Un-
like the dissent,"9 the majority did not think Carrillo was en-
gaged in a personal errand simply because a supervisor had not
asked her to purchase the gift.195 Conversely, in Strickland, the
court decided an employee was on a personal errand, in part,
because her employer had not required her to make the trip she
was on when injured."9 Nevertheless, both the acquiescence by
the employer and the regularity of the going-away parties estab-
lished a reasonable basis for finding Carrillo had not substantial-
ly deviated from the course of her employment.
The court's reasoning is consistent with that used by other
jurisdictions facing similar facts.'97 Like the Montana Supreme
Court, many courts apply the Larson variables when analyzing
this issue. 9 ' Courts frequently award compensation to an em-
ployee injured while on an authorized break if the employer
acquiesced in the employees's participation in the activity on a
regular basis."9 Additionally, courts often mandate benefits if
the employee's conduct falls short of a substantial deviation from
the course of employment.2" A Maryland court, for example,
192. Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 12, 922 P.2d at 1196.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 16, 922 P.2d at 1198 (Erdmann, J., dissenting) (finding that
Carrillo's employer had not compelled her, either directly or indirectly, to purchase
the gift).
195. See id. at 12, 922 P.2d at 1196.
196. See Strickland v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund, 273 Mont. 254, 258, 901
P.2d 1391, 1393 (1995).
197. See infra text accompanying notes 199-203.
198. See Jordan v. Western Elec. Co., 463 P.2d 598, 601-02 (Or. Ct. App. 1970)
(finding that injury arose out of and in course of employment when employee slipped
while returning from a nearby restaurant where employees commonly spent their
breaks); see also King Waterproofing Co. v. Slovsky, 524 A.2d 1245, 1249 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1987) (finding an employee did not substantially deviate from course of
employment because his employer repeatedly acquiesced in employees getting refresh-
ments at a nearby restaurant during break).
199. See Jordan, 463 P.2d at 601-02; see also King Waterproofing Co., 524 A.2d
at 1249; State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 434 P.2d 619, 621
(Cal. 1967).
200. See Roache v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 991, 992 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986)
(awarding compensation after determining claimant's activities did not constitute
substantial deviation from employment); see also Mellis v. McEwen, 703 P.2d 255,
257 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (finding claimant's activity was not departure from employ-
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concluded that a claimant had not abandoned his employment by
going to a nearby carry-out restaurant during his break, in part,
because his employer had repeatedly acquiesced in that activity
in the past."1 Likewise, an Oregon court reached the conclu-
sion that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment
when an employee slipped while returning from a nearby restau-
rant where he and other employees customarily spent their fif-
teen-minute coffee break.' The Oregon court decided the em-
ployer exercised control over the employee because a supervisor
accompanied him to the restaurant, the employee was paid for
the break, and the employer acquiesced in the activity.2' Con-
sequently, application of the Larson variables not only enabled
the court to reach a fair decision in Carrillo, but also provided
direction for future courts analyzing whether an employer re-
tained adequate control over an employee injured while on
break.
C. Benefit Derived By Employer
Although the Larson criteria provide a fairly straightforward
test, the court's analysis suffered because it neglected to address
the issue of whether Carrillo's employer derived any benefit from
her activities. Further, the specific factors analyzed by the
Carrillo court were somewhat different from those used in earli-
er decisions.' Nevertheless, each case decided by the court has
consistently focused on the employer's control over the worker's
activities at the time of injury.
The only significant distinction is the absence in the Carrillo
analysis of any emphasis on whether or not the employer derived
some benefit from the employee's actions. The only mention of
employer benefit was a reference to the Department of Labor's
recognition that breaks serve the interests of employer.0 5
Burying this reference in the section establishing that a break is
a right fixed by contract diluted the potential strength of this
point. This failure to adequately address the benefit issue is
particularly unsettling in light of the testimony by several em-
ment relationship).
201. See King Waterproofing Co., 524 A.2d at 1249.
202. See Jordan, 463 P.2d at 601-02.
203. See id.
204. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
205. See Carrillo v. Liberty Northwest Ins., 278 Mont. 1, 11, 922 P.2d 1189,
1196 (1996) (citing MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.16.1006(1) (1980)).
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ployees, including one supervisor, that going-away parties "bene-
fit[ed] BCBS because they increase[d] employee morale and work
production."2° Perhaps the court felt restricted since the lower
court made no finding of fact on this issue. If so, this is inconsis-
tent with the court's decision to make its own finding that
Carrillo was on break despite the lower court's failure to do
so.2"7 Regardless, the findings contained enough references to
the going-away activities to justify the court addressing the issue
of whether the employer derived any benefit.
By focusing on the Larson variables exclusively, the court
also overlooked an opportunity to align its reasoning with its
own earlier decisions on related matters and with previous hold-
ings by other jurisdictions facing exactly the same issue. In
Courser, the court awarded compensation, in part, because the
employer received a benefit from the employee's activities.'
Going even further in Dale, the court unequivocally stated that
the employer must receive some identifiable benefit before an
injury sustained while traveling is compensable.2 ° Likewise,
both Maryland and Oregon courts were swayed toward awarding
compensation because an employer derived a benefit from its
employee's activities.210 A similar analysis, examining whether
the employer received some benefit from the workers' activity,
could prove relevant when deciding the compensability of inju-
ries occurring while an employee is on break. Unfortunately, by
failing to thoroughly address this issue, future courts are left to
wonder whether or not a benefit received by an employer should
play into deciding if an injury arose out of and in the course of
employment. Applying the employer benefit analysis used in ear-
lier workers' compensation decisions could have eliminated this
confusion.
206. Appellant's Brief at 6, Carrillo (No. 95-396).
207. See Carrillo, 278 Mont. at 5-6, 922 P.2d at 1192-93.
208. See Courser v. Darby Sch. Dist., 214 Mont. 13, 19, 692 P.2d 417, 420 (1984)
(Shea, J., specially concurring).
209. See Dale v. Trade St., Inc., 258 Mont. 349, 355, 854 P.2d 828, 832 (1993).
210. See King Waterproofing Co. v. Slovsky, 524 A.2d 1245, 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1987) (stating the employer benefitted because the break "ostensibly renew[ed]
the employees" vigor"); see also Jordan v. Western Elec. Co., 463 P.2d 598, 601-02
(Or. Ct. App. 1970) (finding employee injured during activity that benefitted both
employee and employer).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Carrillo, the court expanded the scope of Montana's
workers' compensation statute by distinguishing between off-
premises breaks and travel subject to the "going to and from
work" rule, by relaxing the requirement that the employer exer-
cise control over the employee, and by ignoring the requirement
that the employer derive a benefit from the employee's actions.
The court provided a clear map for deciding when an off-premis-
es injury, sustained by an employee during an authorized coffee
break, arises out of and in the course of employment by analyz-
ing the facts in terms of a specific set of factors. Further, this
holding is fairly consistent with that of other jurisdictions inter-
preting similar workers' compensation statutes and with a re-
spected workers' compensation treatise. As such, future decisions
based on the reasoning in Carrillo should withstand further
judicial scrutiny so long as the issue of employer benefit does not
undermine the analysis.
Ultimately, this decision more closely aligns workers' com-
pensation law with current workplace trends. As employers have
begun recognizing the relationship between employee morale and
business productivity, increasingly they have implemented pro-
grams providing for improved employee benefits such as recre-
ational and social breaks, more comprehensive insurance, and
flexible schedules. These shifts in employer attitudes signal a
trend toward improved overall flexibility in the workplace. As
such, legislatures should strive to parallel these gains when
enacting laws affecting employment matters. The Montana Su-
preme Court's consideration of the employer's policy of requiring
flexibility in the timing of daily breaks and the employer's sup-
port of going-away parties illustrates the court's willingness to
acknowledge the realities of the progressive workplace and ad-
just relevant laws accordingly.
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